如何以言行事
2002-03-01
外语教学与研究出版社
J. L. Austin
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The late J.L.Austins influence on contemporary philosophy，which ranked with that of Wittgenstein，was substantial during his lifetime and has grown greatly since his death.He was descrbed asone of the most acute and original minds that England has producde. His 1955 William James Lectures，delivered at Harvard University，were first published in 1962.For this second edition the editors returned to Austins lecture notes and their revisions make this a clearer and more faithful record of Austins works. The lectures set out Austins conclusions in the field to which he directed his main efforts for at least the last ten years of his life.Starting from an exhaustive examination of his already well-known distinction of performative utterances from statements.Austin here finally abandons that distinction，replacing it by a more general theory of illocutionary forces of utterances，which has important bearings of a wide variety of philosophical problems.
王宗炎序沈家煊序导读1 Peformatives and Constatives2 Conditions for Happy Performatives3 Infelicities：Misfires4 Infilicities：Abuses5 Possible Criteria of Performatives6 Explicit Performatives7 Explicit Performative Verbs8 Locutionary，Illocutionary，and Perlocutionary Acts9 Distinctions bet ween Illocutionary and perlocutionary Acts10 In saying...By saying...11 Statements，Performatives，and Illocutionary Force12 Classes of Illocutionary ForceAppendixIndex文库索引
VⅢ Locutionary，Illpcitionary，and Perlocutionary Acts IN embarking on a programme of findine a list of explicit performative verbs， it seemed that we were going to find it not always easy to distinguish Der-formative utterances from constative， and it therefore seemed expedient to go farther back for a while to fundamentals-to consider from the ground up how many senses' there are in which to say something is to do something， or in saying something we do something， and even by saying something we do something， And we began by distinguishing a whole group ofsenses of'doing something' which are all included together when we say， what is obvious， that to say something is in the full normal sense to do something-which includes the utterance of certain noises， the utterance ofcertain words in a certain construction， and the utterance of them with a certain 'meaning' in the favourite philosophical sense of that word， i.e. with a certain sense and with a certain reference. The act of'saying something' in this full normal sense I call， i.e. dub， the performance ofa locutionary act， and the study of utterances thus far and in these respects the study of locutions， or of the full units of speech. Our interest in the locutionary act is， of course， principally to make quite plain what it is， in order to distinguish it from other acts with which we are going to be primarily concerned. Let me add merely that， of course， a great many further refinements woulcl be possible and neces- sary if we were to discuss it for its own sake-refinements of' very great importance not merely to philosophers but to， say， grammarians and phoneticians. We had made three rough distinctions between the phonetic act， the phatic act， and the thetic act. The phonetic act is merely the act of uttering certain noises. The phatic act is the uttering of certain vocables or words， i.e. noises of certain types， belonging to and as belonging to， a certain vocabulary， conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar. The thetic act is the performance of an act of using those vocables with a certain more-or-less definite sense and reference. Thus 'He said "The cat is on the mat" '， reports a phatic act， whereas 'He said that the cat was on the mat' reports a thetic act. A similar contrast is illustrated by the pairs： 'He said''The cat is on the mat" '， 'He said （that） the cat was on the mat'， 'He said''l shall be there" '， 'He said he would be there'; 'He said''Get out" '， 'He told me to get out'; 'He said''Is it in Oxford or Cambridge ?" '; 'He asked whether it was in Oxford or Cambridge'. To pursue this for its own sake beyond our immediate requirements， I shall mention some general points worth remembering： （1） Obviously， to perform a phatic I must perform a phonetic act， or， if you like， in performing one I am performing the other （not， however， that phatic acts arr a sub-class of phonetic acts， we defined the phatic act as the uttering of vocables as belonging to a certain vocabulary） ： but the converse is not true， for if a monkey makes a noise indistinguishable from 'go' it is still not'; phatic act. （2） Obviously in the definition of the phatic act two things were lumped together： vocabulary and grammar. So we have not assigned a special name to the person who utters， for example， 'cat thoroughly the if' or 'the slithy toves did gyre'. Yet a further point arising is the intonation as well as grammar and vocabulary. （3）The phatic act， however， like the phonetic， is essentially mimicable， reproducible （including intonation， winks： gestures， &c.）. One can mimic not merely the statement in quotation marks 'She has lovely hair'， but also the more complex fact that he said it like this：'She has lovely hair' （shrugs）. This is the 'inverted commas' use of csaid' as we get it in novels： every utterance can be just reproduced in inverted commas， or in inverted commas with 'said he' or more often， 'said she'， &c.， after it. But the thetic act is the one we report， iri the case of assertions， by saying 'He said that the cat was on the mat'， 'He said he would go'，'He said Iwas to go' （his words were'You are to go'）. This is the so-called'indirect speech'. If the sense or reference is not being taken as clear， then the whole or part is to be in quotation marks. Thus I might say：'He said I was to go to“the minister"， but he did not say which minister' or 'I said that he was behaving badly and he replied that“the higher you get the fewer"'. We cannot， however， always use 'said that' easily： we would say 'told to'， 'advise to'， &c.， if he used the imperative mood， or such equivalent phrases as 'said I was to'， 'said I should'， &c. Compare such phrases as 'bade me welcome' and 'extended his apologies'. I add one further point about the thetic act： of course sense and reference （naming and referring） themselves are here ancillary acts performed in performing the thetic act. Thus we may say cl meant by¨bank" . . .' and we say 'by "he" I was referring to . . .'. Can we perform a thetic act without referring or without naming? In general it would seem that the answer is that we cannot， but there are puzzling cases. What is the reference in 'all triangles have three sides'? Correspondingly， it is clear that we can perform a phatic act which is not a thetic act， though not conversely. Thus we may repeat someone else's remark or mumble over some sentence， or we may read a Latin sentence without knowing the meaning of the words. The question when one pheme or one theme is the same as anotherj whether in the 'type' or 'token' sense， and the question what is one single pheme or theme， do not so much matter here. But， of course， it is important to remember that the same pheme， e.g.， sentence， that is， tokens of the same type， may be used on different occasions of utterance with a different sense or reference. ……
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