Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics法学与政治中的自然法则

2006-3  

Cambridge Univ Pr  

Murphy, Mark C.  

188  

无  

　　Natural law is a perennial though poorly represented and understood issue in political philosophy and the philosophy of law. Mark C. Murphy argues that the central thesis of natural law jurisprudence--that law is backed by decisive reasons for compliance--sets the agenda for natural law political philosophy, which demonstrates how law gains its binding force by way of the common good of the political community. Murphy's work ranges over the central questions of natural law jurisprudence and political philosophy, including the formulation and defense of the natural law jurisprudential thesis, the nature of the common good, the connection between the promotion of the common good and requirement of obedience to law, and the justification of punishment.

Mark C. Murphy is Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University. He is the author of Natural Law and Practical Rationality, An Essay on Divine Authority, and Philosophy of Law, and is editor of Alasdair MacIntyre.

Acknowledgments Introduction: Natural Law Jurisprudence and Natural Law Political Philosophy 0.1 THE CENTRAL CLAIMS OF NATURAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE AND NATURAL LAW POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 0.2 NATURAL LAW AND PRACTICAL RATIONALITY 1　Natural Law Jurisprudence Formulated 　1.1 THE FUNDAMENTAL CLAIM OF NATURAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE 　1.2 NATURAL LAW THEORY AND LEGAL POSITIVISM 2　Natural Law Jurisprudence Defended 　2.1 THREE ROUTES TO THE WEAK NATURAL LAW THESIS 　2.2 THE LEGAL POINT OF VIEW AND THE WEAK NATURAL LAW THESIS 　2.3 LAW’S FUNCTION AND THE WEAK NATURAL LAW THESIS 　2.4 ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS AND THE WEAK NATURAL LAW THESIS 　2.5 THE RELATION BETWEEN THE FUNCTION AND ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS ARGUMENTS 　2.6 THE WEAK NATURAL LAW THESIS, THE STRONG NATURAL LAW THESIS, AND LEGAL POSITIVISM 　2.7 THE AGENDA FOR NATURAL LAW POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 3　The Common Good 　3.1 THE COMMON GOOD IN NATURAL LAW POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 　3.2 THE ARGUMENT FOR THE AGGREGATIVE CONCEPTION OF THE COMMON GOOD 　3.3 AGAINST THE INSTRUMENTALIST CONCEPTION OF THE COMMON GOOD 　3.4 AGAINST THE DISTINCTIVE GOOD CONCEPTION OF THE COMMON GOOD 　3.5 UTILITARIANISM AND THE AGGREGATIVE CONCEPTION OF THE COMMON GOOD 　3.6 THE COMMON GOOD PRINCIPLE 4　The Natural Law Rejection of Consent Theory 　4.1 CONSENT AND NATURAL LAW THEORIES, CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY 　4.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM CONSENT 　4.3 AGAINST CONSENT THEORIES: IMPLAUSIBLE AB INITIO 　4.4 AGAINST CONSENT THEORIES: THE PAUCITY OF CONSENT 　4.5 AGAINST CONSENT THEORIES: INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE NATURAL LAW VIEW 　4.6 AGAINST CONSENT THEORIES: UNNECESSARY (THE SALIENT COORDINATOR ACCOUNT) 　4.7 THE REFUTATION OF THE SALIENT COORDINATOR ACCOUNT 5　A Consent Theory of the Authority of Law 　5.1 A NON-STANDARD CONSENT ACCOUNT 　5.2 LAW AND THE COMMON GOOD PRINCIPLE 　5.3 HOW CAN DETERMINATIONS BIND? 　5.4 OPEN-ENDED DETERMINATIONS 　5.5 THE NATURAL LAW/CONSENT ACCOUNT OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 　5.6 THE UNIQUE APPROPRIATENESS OF CONSENT IN THE ACCEPTANCE SENSE 　5.7 HOW FAR DOES THIS CONSENT VIEW ESTABLISH THE LAW’S AUTHORITY? 6　The Authority of Law and Legal Punishment 　6.1 THE PLACE OF PUNISHMENT WITHIN A NATURAL LAW ACCOUNT OF POLITICS 　6.2 THE QUASI-UTILITARIAN NATURAL LAW ACCOUNT OF PUNISHMENT REJECTED 　6.3 THE EQUALITY NATURAL LAW ACCOUNT OF PUNISHMENT REJECTED 　6.4 NATURAL LAW RETRIBUTIVISM 　6.5 DIFFICULTIES WITH RETRIBUTIVIST THEORIES 　6.6 ACTING IN LIGHT OF THE GOOD: PROMOTION AND EXPRESSION 　6.7 DIFFICULTIES WITH EXPRESSIVE VIEWS OF PUNISHMENT 　6.8 AUTHORITY, COERCION, AND PUNISHMENT 7　Beneath and Beyond the Common Good 　7.1 TWO CHALLENGES TO THE COMMON GOOD PRINCIPLE 　7.2 WHY THE CHALLENGES ARE ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT TO MEET 　7.3 THE ARISTOTELIAN REPLY TO THE CHALLENGES TO THE COMMON GOOD PRINCIPLE 　7.4 DOUBTS ABOUT THE ARISTOTELIAN REPLY Works Cited Index

无

Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics法学与政治中的自然法则 PDF格式下载