激励理论

2013-1  

拉奉特 世界图书出版公司 (2013-01出版)  

拉奉特  

421  

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　　The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead， our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.　　Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.　　……

　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

作者:(美)拉奉特

ForewordIntroductionl Incentives in Economic Thought 1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture 1.2 Chester Barlmrd and Incentives in Management 1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Groves: Tile Free-Rider Problem 1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting 1.5 Leon Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies 1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance 1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives 1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination 1.9 Incentives in Planned Economies 1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design 1.11 Auctions2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off 2.1 The Basic Model 2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract 2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts 2.4 Information Rents 2.5 The Optimization Program of the Principal 2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off 2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information 2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing 2.9 Tile Revelation Principle 2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent 2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints 2.12 Commitment 2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms, 2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting, 2.15 Contract Theory at Work Appendix3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection 3.1 More than Two Types 3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information 3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and Countervailing IncentiTces 3.4 Random Participation Constraint 3,5 Limited Liability 3,6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification 3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off Appendices4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs 4.1 Tile Model 4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best hnplementation 4.3 The Trade-Off Between Limited Liability Rent Extraction and Efficiency 4.4 Tile Trade-Off Between Insurance and Efficiency 4.5 More than Two Levels of Performance 4.6 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting 4.7 Moral Hazard and the Theory of the Finn 4.8 Contract Theory at Work 4.9 Commitment Under Moral Hazard. Appendices5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard. 5.1 More than Two Levels of Effort 5.2 The Multitask Incentive Problem 5.3 Nonseparability of the Utility Function 5.4 Redistribution and Moral Hazard Appendices6 Nonverifiability 6.1 No Contract at Date 0 and Ex Post Bargaining 6.2 Incentive Compatible Contract 6.3 Nash Implementation 6.4 Subgame-Perfect Implementation 6.5 Risk Aversion 6.6 Concluding Remarks7 Mixed Models 7.1 Adverse Selection Followed by Moral Hazard 7.2 Moral Hazard Followed by Adverse Selection 7.3 Moral Hazard Followed by Nonverifiability8 Dynamics under Full Commitment 8.1 Repeated Adverse Selection b.2 Repeated Moral Hazard 8.3 Constraints on Transfers: The Role of hnplicit Incentives9 Limits and Extensions 9.1 Informed Principal. 9.2 Limits to Enforcement 9.3 Dynamics and Limited Commitment 9.4 The Hold-Up Problem 9.5 Limits to the Complexity of Contracts 9.6 Limits in the Action Space 9.7 Limits to Rational Behavior 9.8 Endogenous Information StructuresReferencesAuthor IndexSubject Index

　　《激励理论：委托代理模型》是著名微观理论经济学家拉奉特以及其学生martimort的合写的理论著作，其影响力可想而知。经济学和激励的关系密切，如激励努力工作、激励高质量产品、激励努力学习、激励投资和激励储蓄。尽管adam smith两百多年前在他的佃农合同分析中充分肯定了这一点，但只有在近些年这个理论在经济思想中才占据了核心地位。本书中，jean-jacques laffont 和david martimort对激励理论的表述是目前最透彻的和最容易学习的。本理论的核心是对现代管理就如同对经济理论一样至关重要的简单问题：是什么让人们在一个经济和商业环境中会有特殊的表现？为了寻找答案，书中给出了特定的环境下能够确保对经济机构的良好激励的方法论工具。 读者对象：数学、经济相关专业的本科生、研究生和相关经济领域的从业人员。

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研究委托代理模型的必读书目。

Laffont最后的遗憾，本来计划写三本，但是“出师未捷身先死”啊，就这一本也够经典的了。以前只有中文翻译版，而且还断了货，终于买到了英文版的最后一本！